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# 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
-vs- : Case No. 
14482 
LUCKIE JOHN HOWELL, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of the crime 
of aggravated assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of the crime of aggravated 
assault before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, District 
Judge, presiding without a jury. Appellant was sentenced to 
the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower 
court decision, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 16, 1975, the appellant and Gene Earl 
Bunderson left Mrc Bunderson1s home and went to a tavern 
called Murphfs to shoot some pool and have a few beers 
(T.6). The appellant and Mr. Bunderson had approximately 
seven or eight glasses of beer a piece before they left 
the tavern around 10:00 p.m. Mr. Bunderson then gave the 
appellant a ride to where his truck was located. Mr* 
Bunderson then entered his own home, took two cans of 
beer out of the refrigerator to take up the street to 
where the appellant was staying to finish out the evening 
(T.15). 
Mr. Bunderson pulled his car behind the appellant's 
truck and got out of his car (T.15)* Mr. Bunderson approached 
the appellant and was in the process of handing him. a beer 
when the appellant beat Mr. Bunderson about the face and body 
with a metal pipe (T.16). As a result, Mr. Bunderson was 
severely injured (Exhibits 1, 2). Before trial the appellant 
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went through psychiatric examinations• Based upon the 
medical reports, the judge, sitting as trier of factf 
determined that the appellant was sane and responsible at 
the time of the incident in question (T.127). 
On the basis of the reports, the trial judge 
ruled that the appellant did not suffer a mental defect 
and that intoxication could not be a defense to a crime 
of this nature. Respondent urges that the lower court 
decision be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT IS A CRIME OF GENERAL INTENT, 
* NOT SPECIFIC INTENT; THEREFORE, INTOXICATION OF THE 
DEFENDANT CANNOT BE USED AS A DEFENSE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953), as amended, 
states: 
11
 (1) A person commits aggravated 
assault if he commits assault as 
defined in § 76-5-102 and: 
(A) He intentionally causes 
serious bodily injury to another or 
(B) He uses a deadly weapon 
or such means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily 
injury." 
-3-
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The definition referred to in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 
(1953), as amended, is: 
3
'(1) Assault is; (a) An attempt, 
with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or (b) A 
threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another. (2) Assault 
is a class B misdemeanor." 
Respondent submits that the crime of aggravated 
assault as stated by Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953), as 
amended, is a crime which requires only a general intent and 
therefore, intoxication does not negate such intent. 
Traditionally, simply assault and assault with a 
deadly weapon have been referred to as "general intent" 
«• crimes. People v. Wingo, 121 Cal.Rptr. 97, 534 P.2d 1001 
(1975); People v. Morrow, 74 Cal.Rptr. 551 (1969); People 
v. Sandoval, 35 Cal.Rptr. 227 (1963). 
In State v. Jamison, 110 Ariz< 245, 517 P.2d 1241 
(1974), defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. On 
appeal, defendant contended that the crime of aggravated 
assault is a crime that requires specific as opposed to 
general intent. The Court held: 
"General criminal intent is implied 
from the act itself while specific intent 
is not. In the instant case we believe that 
the crime of assault of a police officer is 
a crime of general intent*" Id. at 1244. 
-4-
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The Court went on further to state: 
"In general intent cases/ once 
the commission of the crime has 
been shown the absence of general 
intent may be shown by the defendant, 
but this is the defendants burden 
and voluntary intoxication will 
not negate general intent." Id,, at 
1244. 
In People v. Rocha, 92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372 
(1971), the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly 
weapon and asserted as error that the crime of assault with 
a deadly weapon was a crime which required a specific intent. 
Therefore, his intoxication could be introduced to negate 
the element of intent. The Court held that assault with a 
deadly weapon is a general intent crime. Therefore, intoxica-
tion could not negate such intent. The Court went further 
to state: 
"[T]he criminal intent which is 
required for assault with a deadly 
weapon . . . is the general intent 
to wilfully commit an act the direct, 
natural and probable consequences of 
which if successfully completed would 
be the injury to another. Given that 
intent it is immaterial whether or not 
the defendant intended to violate the 
law or knew that his conduct was 
unlawful. The intent to cause any 
particular injury. . .to severely 
injure another, or to injure in the 
sense of inflicting bodily harm, is 
not necessary." Id. at 376,377. 
-5-
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In the instant case, the appellant, with a 36 
inch long pipe in hand, proceeded to beat the victim about 
the face, ribs and legs (T.15,16). The result was a split 
in the victim1s lip extending to the tip of the nose 
(Exhibits 1,2). Since alcohol is so often a factor in 
inducing simple assaults and aggravated assaults, it would 
be anomalous to permit exculpation because of intoxication. 
The crime of aggravated assault in Utah is a crime 
of general intent, not specific intent? therefore, intoxica-
tion is not a defense. The long-standing rule in Utah has 
always been that in criminal cases a person is presumed to 
intend the natural and probable consequences of his unlawful 
acts. Uintah Freight Lines v. Public Service Commission, 
119 Utah 491, 229 P.2d 675 (1951). 
In the instant case, the State proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the appellant wilfully used unlawful 
force upon the victim causing severe injury (T.4-25, Exhibits 
1,2). 
As stated in People v. Rocha, supra; 
"[I]t would be anomalous to allow 
evidence of intoxication to relieve a 
man of responsibility for the crimes of 
assault with a deadly weapon or simple 
assault which are so frequently committed 
in just such a manner.'1 Id. at 374. 
-6 
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POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1953), AS AMENDED, 
WHICH PROVIDES THAT A MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT IS A DEFENSE 
TO A CRIMINAL CHARGE, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE. 
The appellant in this case was subjected to 
psychiatric examinations. Judge VeNoy Christoffersen, 
sitting as the trier of fact, determined from two medical 
reports that there was no doubt that the appellant was 
sane and responsible at the time of the incident in 
question. Judge Christoffersen stated: 
"Well, I've read both reports and 
studied both of them. I think that 
they have pretty well answered the 
questions you raise and state with a 
great deal of specificity what they 
feel the problem is. First of all 
Dr. Wheelwright stated that there's 
no question in his mind that he's 
sane, responsible at the time of the 
incident in question, with the 
exception of intoxication. . . And 
Dr. Fox states essentially the same 
thing only goes into it a little 
further. . . And to me that is not 
a legal defense and I think that's 
exactly what the doctors have told 
us. . . ." (T.127). 
The Judge as the trier of fact sits in the best 
position to view the evidence. In the instant case, there 
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was sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine 
that appellant was not the victim of a mental disease or 
defect at the time of the incident in question. That 
trial court decision is entitled to a presumption of 
validity and should only be disturbed in cases where the 
record is clearly void of evidence to support such findings. 
Latimer v. Katz, 29 Utah 2d 280, 508 P.2d 542 (1973). 
Utah Code Ann* § 76-2-305 (1953), as amended, 
states the following: 
"Mental disease or defect—(1) 
In any prosecution for an offense, 
it shall be a defense that the 
defendant, at the time of the 
proscribed conduct, as a result of 
mental disease or defect, lacked 
substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law. 
(2) As used in this section, 
the terms "mental disease1 or 
sdefect' do not include an 
abnormality manifested only be 
repeated criminal or otherwise 
antisocial conduct." 
In this case it is the finding of the trier of 
fact and the conclusion of the medical reports that the 
episodes in question arose because of the appellant's 
excessive use of alcohol and drugs (T.127). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Subparagraph (2) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 
(1953), as amended, clearly states that the terms "mental 
disease" or "defect" do not include abnormalities resulting 
from repeated criminal or antisocial conduct. Judge 
Christoffersen, based upon the medical reports,found that 
appellant's behavior was caused by excessive use of alcohol. 
Therefore, appellant's alleged mental defect does not meet 
the definition under subparagraph (2) of Section 76-2-305. 
It was concluded that the defect was the result of repeated 
criminal or antisocial conduct; therefore, it is not a defense. 
As stated by Judge Christoffersen: 
"THE COURTs Subparagraph two, 
if that is the defect, it certainly 
# is a result of repeated criminal or 
otherwise antisocial conduct, and that 
is the taking of drugs. It therefore 
does not become a defense; would find 
the defendant guilty." (Lines 18-21, 
T.128). 
The Utah Supreme Court in reviewing the record of 
this case must assume that the trial judge believed and 
regarded as important and persuasive the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom which 
supported his findings and judgment. Chatterley v. Omnico, 
26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d 667 (1971). 
-9-
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In State v. Brantley, 11 Wash.App. 716, 525 P,2d 
813, 815 (1974), the defendant challenged his conviction 
on the grounds of insanity and diminished capacity as a 
result of intoxication. The Court stated: 
"It is clearly the law and 
defendant does not contend other-
wise that mental irresponsibility 
induced by voluntary intoxication 
does not raise the defense of 
insanity." 
In the instant case, the findings and judgment 
of the lower court as trier of fact should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (1953), AS AMENDED, IS 
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE BECAUSE AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT IS A CRIME OF GENERAL INTENT,NOT SPECIFIC INTENT. 
Aggravated assault is a crime that requires a 
general intent, not a specific intent. Therefore, intoxica-
tion cannot negate such intent. 
In People v. Parks, 95 Cal.Rptr. 193, 485 P*2d 
257 (1971), the defendant was convicted of assault with 
a deadly weapon and asserted intoxication as a defense. 
The Court held that the requisite general intent for 
assault with a deadly weapon and any of the lesser assaults 
-10-
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included therein may not be negated through a showing of 
voluntary intoxication. See also People v. Rocha, supra. 
It is clear that the acts of the defendant 
provided the requisite general intent to convict him of 
the crime charged. The defendant with a metal pipe beat 
the victim about the face, ribs, and legs and caused severe 
damage (T.15-16, Exhibits 1,2). 
The Utah Supreme Court is entitled to presume 
that the findings of fact and judgment of the lower court 
are correct unless said judgment is in error by material 
uncontroverted evidence. Horman v. Lloyd, 28 Utah 2d 112, 
499 P.2d 124 (1972). Respondent respectfully submits that 
Section 76-2-306 is not applicable to the instant case, 
because intoxication cannot negate a crime that requires a 
general intent. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the crime 
of aggravated assault is a crime which requires a general 
culpable intent,not a specific intent. It is clear that 
crimes requiring only general intent do not have the 
defense of intoxication. Therefore, voluntary intoxication 
cannot be used to negate that general intent. Under the 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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< 
facts of this case, in light of the reports of Doctors 
Wheelwright and Fox, the appellant failed to meet the 
threshold of insanity required by the Utah Code. 
Respondent respectfully submits that all 
findings of fact and conclusions of law found by the 
trial court judge be viewed in a favorable light and 
affirmed. 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
i 
_1 O — 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
1~JUN1977 
BR1GKAM YOUNG UI'/iVERSITY 
J. Reuben Csft b\v School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
